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Rethinking Mechanistic Explanation
Stuart Glennan†‡
Butler University
Philosophers of science typically associate the causal-mechanical view of scientific ex-
planation with the work of Railton and Salmon. In this paper I shall argue that the
defects of this view arise from an inadequate analysis of the concept of mechanism. I
contrast Salmon’s account of mechanisms in terms of the causal nexus with my own
account of mechanisms, in which mechanisms are viewed as complex systems. After
describing these two concepts of mechanism, I show how the complex-systems approach
avoids certain objections to Salmon’s account of causal-mechanical explanation. I con-
clude by discussing how mechanistic explanations can provide understanding by uni-
fication.
1. Introduction. Recent philosophical work on scientific explanation has
been dominated by two approaches: Salmon’s (1984) causal-mechanical
approach suggests that scientific explanations explain events by showing
how they fit into the causal structure of the world, while Kitcher’s (1989)
explanatory unification approach suggests that explanations explain by
showing how diverse phenomena fit into unifying patterns. While both
Salmon and Kitcher acknowledge that many explanations unify and that
many other explanations exhibit causal mechanisms, they differ sharply
on which of these approaches is fundamental. Salmon claims that unifi-
cation occurs because many physical processes utilize the same basic
causal mechanisms, while Kitcher suggests that our claims about causes
are ultimately based upon unifying explanatory patterns. As Kitcher puts
it, “the unification view . . . proposes to ground causal claims in claims
about explanatory dependency rather than visa versa” (Kitcher 1989, 436).
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While I believe that Salmon is ultimately correct, he has been hampered
in defending his view by an inadequate analysis of the nature of causal
mechanisms. My aim in this paper will be to provide an improved analysis
of mechanisms—one adequate to illuminate the unifying power of mecha-
nistic explanation.
2. Salmon and Railton on Causal-Mechanical Explanation. Peter Railton
(1978) first introduced the idea of mechanism into the contemporary lit-
erature on explanation with his deductive-nomothetic model of probabi-
listic explanation (DNP). The DNP model was meant to be an alternative
to Hempel’s inductive statistical (IS) model. Railton was concerned with
Hempel’s requirement that the explanans of an IS explanation render the
explanandum probable or nomically expectable. On Railton’s view, ex-
planations describe causes, and sometimes the sequence of events leading
up to the event to be explained may be improbable. According to Railton,
while an explanation of some event may include a reference to a law that
renders the event nomically expectable, the account must be supplemented
by “an account of the mechanism(s) at work” (1978, 748). Railton is de-
liberately vague on just what a mechanism is, indicating only that an “ac-
count of the mechanism(s)” is “a more or less complete filling-in of the
links in the causal chains” (1978, 748).
Salmon’s work on causal-mechanical explanation can be seen as an
attempt to elaborate on Railton’s earlier account of mechanistic expla-
nation. Curiously, nowhere in this book does Salmon offer an explicit
definition of mechanisms. Rather, he provides a characterization of what
he calls the “causal nexus,” which he takes to be a vast network of inter-
acting causal processes. Much of Salmon’s work is directed at providing
an adequate definition of just what count as causal processes and inter-
actions. According to his definition, a process is an entity that maintains
a persistent structure through space-time, a causal process is a process
capable of transmitting changes in its structure, and a causal interaction
is an intersection between causal processes in which an alteration of the
persistent properties of those processes occurs. In Salmon’s original for-
mulation interactions were defined in terms of a counterfactual criterion
of mark transmission, but in more recent versions (1994) he has eliminated
reference to counterfactuals, defining causal interactions in terms of ex-
change of conserved quantities. While Salmon has spent considerable ef-
fort subsequent to 1984 trying to refine his characterizations of processes
and interactions, his view of the causal nexus as a network of interacting
processes remains essentially unchanged. Causal-mechanical explanation
exemplifies what Salmon calls the ontic conception of explanation. Expla-
nations are not arguments, but are rather descriptions of features of a
mind-independent reality—the causal structure of the world.
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3. The Complex-Systems Approach to Mechanism. While the term “causal-
mechanical explanation” has come in the literature to refer to the theories
of explanation proposed by Railton and Salmon, a number of philoso-
phers have been developing a quite different analysis of mechanism—one
that leads to an alternative conception of causal-mechanical explanation.
Central to this alternative conception is the idea that a mechanism is a
“complex system.” The germ of this conception can be found in Wimsatt’s
work, which in turn has antecedents in the work of Herbert Simon. This
conception has been developed to a greater degree in my own work (Glen-
nan 1996), as well as that of Bechtel and Richardson (1993) and, most
recently, Machamer, Darden, and Craver (2000). While there are differ-
ences between these approaches, they all share the view that mechanisms
are complex systems.
A number of definitions of mechanism have been suggested, but my
preferred one is as follows:
(M) A mechanism for a behavior is a complex system that produces
that behavior by the interaction of a number of parts, where the
interactions between parts can be characterized by direct, invar-
iant, change-relating generalizations.
I shall not repeat arguments I have made elsewhere (Glennan 1996) for
this definition, but a few clarifications are in order. First, mechanisms are
not mechanisms simpliciter, but mechanisms for behaviors. A complex
system may exhibit several different behaviors, and the decomposition of
the system will depend upon which behavior is under consideration. For
instance, a heart is both a mechanism that pumps blood and a mechanism
that produces noise; the heart qua pump may admit of a different decom-
position than the heart qua noisemaker. Second, mechanisms consist of a
number of parts. These parts must be objects, in the most general sense.
They must have a relatively high degree of robustness or stability; that is,
in the absence of interventions, their properties must remain relatively
stable. Generally these parts can be spatially localized.
A mechanism operates by the interaction of parts. An interaction is an
occasion on which a change in a property of one part brings about a
change in a property of another part. For instance, a change in the position
of one gear within a clock mechanism may bring about the change in the
position of an interlocking gear. “Interaction” is a causal notion that must
be understood in terms of the truth of certain counterfactuals. The stip-
ulation that these interactions can be characterized by invariant, change-
relating generalizations is meant to capture the relevant counterfactual
truth claims.
I borrow the phrase “invariant, change-relating generalization” from
Jim Woodward (2000). To say that a generalization is change-relating is
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1. In earlier papers (Glennan 1992, 1996) I have called generalizations describing in-
teractions between parts “laws.” I did so with the caveat that these laws must be un-
derstood in a more homely way than philosophers typically understand them. Wood-
ward and others have convinced me that, given that many philosophers think laws must
be exceptionless, my use of the term “law” was liable to lead to misunderstanding. For
more on the relationship between laws and change-relating generalizations, see the on-
line version of this paper.
to say that it describes a relationship between two or more variables in
which an intervention that changes one variable will bring about a change
in another variable. For instance, the Boyle-Charles law can be regarded
as a change-relating generalization, since intervention on one variable, say
the temperature of an enclosed volume of gas, can bring about a change
in another variable, the pressure of the gas.1 The stipulation that these
generalizations be direct is meant to eliminate cases where a change in one
part brings about a change in another part via the action of intervening
parts.
Perhaps the most notable difference between the complex-systems and
Salmon/Railton approach is that Salmon/Railton mechanisms are se-
quences of interconnected events while complex-systems mechanisms are
things (or objects). When Salmon or Railton talk about mechanisms, they
are generally talking about a chain or web of events leading up to a par-
ticular event. For instance, they might speak about the chain of events
that lead to the breaking of a certain window: a boy hit a baseball; the
baseball ricocheted off the tree and crashed into the window. While the
sequence of events leading to the breaking of the window certainly involves
some entities that are stable enough to be called objects—the boy, the
baseball, the bat, the tree, and the window—the complex of these objects
do not form a stable enough configuration to be called an object.
Compare these examples to examples of mechanisms on the complex-
systems conception: for instance, watches, cells, organisms, and social
groups. These mechanisms are systems consisting of stable arrangements
of parts. In virtue of these arrangements, the systems as a whole have
stable dispositions—the behaviors of these mechanisms. These disposi-
tions can manifest themselves at more than one time and place. In this
sense, the behavior of a complex-systems mechanism is general. The
watch, for instance, continues its periodic motion more-or-less indefinitely.
Complex-systems mechanisms are general in a second sense. Although any
particular mechanism will occupy a particular region of space-time, it is
an important feature of our world that it often contains many tokens of
a single type of mechanism. For instance, the human central nervous sys-
tem contains around a trillion neurons. There are lots of human beings,
as well as lots of other organisms, that have neurons whose structure is
similar to that of human neurons. Consequently, one can develop a general
model of neurons that subsumes countless neural events.
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A second difference between the Salmon/Railton and complex-systems
conceptions of mechanism has to do with the treatment of interactions.
At a general level, there is a similarity between the accounts. The parts
referred to in (M) are objects, and objects can be understood as causal
processes in Salmon’s sense. Interactions between these parts will then be
intersections in causal processes that introduce changes to the persistent
structure of those processes, i.e., changes to the properties of the parts.
However, there is a decided difference between the explication of inter-
actions. While I have characterized interactions using direct invariant
change-relating generalizations, Salmon has recently (1994) characterized
them in terms of exchange of conserved quantities. For instance, two col-
liding particles interact when they exchange a conserved quantity like mo-
mentum. Salmon moved to the conserved quantity approach to avoid cer-
tain objections to the counterfactual approach (Kitcher 1989), and while
the move has the advantage of characterizing interactions in terms of
physical theory rather than the semantics of counterfactuals, it has the
disadvantage that it obscures similarities between kinds of interactions
among higher-level entities. Consider, for instance, a social mechanism
whereby information is disseminated through a phone-calling chain. The
people in the chain are the mechanism’s parts and each phone call repre-
sents an interaction between parts of the system. Now each such interac-
tion must, in virtue of the supervenience of everything upon physics, in-
volve a string of physical events in which conserved quantities are
exchanged. However, to say that my phone call involves the exchange of
a conserved quantity is utterly uninformative about the nature of partic-
ular interactions over the phone. To talk in terms of exchange of conserved
quantities requires us to treat mechanisms at a level at which such talk is
intelligible, namely at the level of physics. But different tokens of a single
higher level event type (e.g., a phone call event type) may have nothing in
common in terms of their micro-physical descriptions. Thus, if interactions
are characterized in terms of exchange of conserved quantities, tokens of
higher level interactions cannot be recognized as forming higher-level
kinds.
4. Mechanistic Explanation on the Complex-Systems Approach. Let us con-
sider how to develop an account of mechanistic explanation consistent
with the complex-systems approach. Philosophers have generally agreed
that scientific explanations come in (at least) two varieties—explanation
of singular events and explanation of general regularities. Let us begin
with the mechanistic explanation of regularities. Roughly, the idea is this:
To mechanistically explain a regularity, one describes a mechanism whose
behavior is characterized by that regularity. For instance, a mechanistic
explanation of Mendel’s law of segregation will describe the meiotic mech-
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anism that produce gametes and show how this mechanism creates (as-
suming certain background conditions) an equal number of gametes con-
taining each allele of a given locus.
To spell this account out in more detail, we need to introduce the notion
of a mechanical model:
(MM) A mechanical model is a description of a mechanism, including
(i) a description of the mechanism’s behavior; and (ii) a de-
scription of the mechanism which accounts for that behavior.
(Glennan under review)
The two-part characterization of a mechanism, in terms of a behavior and
the mechanism that produces it, leads naturally to a two-part character-
ization of a mechanical model. The behavioral description is a description
of the external behavior of a mechanism. The mechanical description is a
description of the internal structure—the guts of the mechanism. The dis-
tinction between behavioral and mechanical descriptions is roughly the
distinction between what a system is doing and how it is doing it.
For the purpose of illustrating how mechanisms can explain regulari-
ties, we will consider the behavior of what I call an input-output mecha-
nism. An input-output mechanism is a complex system that is situated in
its environment in such a way that there are characteristic environmental
events (inputs) that trigger a sequence—perhaps multi-stranded—of in-
teractions between parts of the mechanism. This sequence concludes with
some terminating event, the output. A familiar example of an input-output
mechanism is a computer running a word processing program: key presses
are inputs while the characters that appear on the screen are outputs.
The behavior of input-output mechanisms can be characterized by the
same type of invariant change-relating generalizations that characterize
interactions between parts. Take such a generalization as an explanandum.
Evidently, to the extent that a description of the internal workings of the
mechanism elucidates the process by which the parts of the mechanism,
triggered by the input event, interact in order to produce the output event,
that description can be construed as the explanans. To put it more suc-
cinctly, the mechanical description associated with the mechanical model
illustrates why the behavioral description is true.
The process of mechanistic explanation requires one to formulate, per-
haps in very sketchy terms, a mechanical model. The two parts of this
model, the behavioral and the mechanical descriptions, are respectively
the explanandum and explanans in the mechanistic explanation. Because
these descriptions are generally statements, the mechanical model can be
construed as an argument in which the statements in the mechanical de-
scription are premises and the conjunction of statements in the behavioral
 S348
description is the conclusion. So construed, explanations apparently are
arguments, just as Hempel and Kitcher suggest. I would like to resist this
conclusion. While it is sometimes the case that a description of the parts
of the mechanism will entail a description of the mechanism’s outward
behavior, the explanation lies not in the logical relationship between these
descriptions but in the causal relationships between the parts of the mech-
anism that produce the behavior described.
The mechanisms so far discussed are systems consisting of relatively
stable configurations of parts that give rise to robust behaviors which can
be expressed by invariant generalizations. I have argued elsewhere (Glen-
nan 1996, 1997) that most of the generalizations that scientists call laws
are in fact descriptions of the behavior of mechanisms. Mendel’s laws
describe aspects of the behavior of mechanisms that transmit genetic ma-
terial; Kepler’s laws describe aspects of the behavior of gravitational mech-
anisms, and so on. Laws of this kind I call mechanically explicable laws.
While most laws are mechanically explicable, inevitably there must be
some laws that are not. For instance, given our present understanding of
electricity and magnetism, it appears that Maxwell’s equations are not
mechanically explicable. There is not, for instance, a mechanical ether
consisting of particles whose interactions could explain the propagation
of electromagnetic waves. Laws such as these, which I call fundamental
laws, represent brute nomological facts of our universe.
Mechanisms consisting of complex systems with stable relationships
between parts can explain many of the regularities that occur in the world.
But what of the explanation of particular events? There are two different
sorts of events that we might seek to explain. On the one hand, there are
events that are the product of the operation of reliable mechanisms. On
the other, there are events that are not the product of such mechanisms.
These latter events I call “genuinely singular events.”
Explanation of events that are the product of reliable mechanisms fol-
low a pattern familiar from standard accounts of explanation by nomic
subsumption. Consider, for instance, the explanation of the fact that my
son John has blue eyes. Blue eyes involve expression of a recessive gene.
Given that my wife has blue eyes and I do not, she must carry two copies
of the recessive allele while I carry one. Consequently, given the mecha-
nisms of gamete formation, reproduction, and expression of genes deter-
mining eye color, there is a probability of 50% (relative to a generally
satisfied set of background conditions) that John would have blue eyes,
as in fact he does. Our explanation looks like this:
My wife is homozygous for the recessive allele for blue eyes.
I am heterozygous for the recessive allele for blue eyes.
John is our biological child.
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If a child has one parent who is homozygous for a recessive allele and
one who is heterozygous, the probability of the child being homo-
zygous is 50%
John has blue eyes. [p .5]
This is a typical example of explanation by nomic subsumption (except
that it would not meet Hempel’s high probability requirement). Its only
connection with mechanistic explanation is that the statistical “law” which
serves as its fourth premise is mechanically explicable.
While arguments of this kind are explanatory, it is also possible to ask
for a different kind of explanation of the event in question. Rather than
show how a certain mechanically explicable law gives a certain event some
degree of probability, it is possible to explain this event by going through
a play-by-play description of the operation of the relevant mechanism on
that occasion. In this case, one could tell the story of the formation of the
egg and sperm, the events leading to the particular sperm fertilizing the
particular egg, and the subsequent developmental sequence leading to
the expression of the particular gene combination in John’s blue eyes.
While explanations of this kind are possible, it is generally preferable with
events of this sort to pursue a two-part explanatory strategy. First, provide
a nomic subsumption explanation of the event, and, second, provide a
mechanistic explanation of the law or invariant regularity under which the
event is subsumed. This strategy explains both what caused the particular
event in question and how that cause fits into a common pattern.
Kim Sterelny (1996) has offered some useful terms to characterize the
difference between the two types of explanations of a particular event like
my son’s developing blue eyes. Sterelny suggests that, depending on our
explanatory interests, we can explain a particular event either as the result
of a robust process or as the result of an actual sequence. To illustrate this
claim, he considers two different explanations of the outbreak of World
War I (1996, 195). The actual-sequence explanation describes in detail the
events leading to declarations of war in August 1914—the visit of the
Archduke to Sarajevo, his assassination, the Austrian response, and so
on. The robust-process explanation offers a more general description of
the system of alliances, mobilization plans, nationalism, militarism and
other features of Europe in 1914 that in retrospect suggest that World
War I was more or less bound to happen. Sterelny argues that these ex-
planations are both correct, but are appropriate answers to different ques-
tions.
Sterelny appears to believe that one can explain any event either from
the robust process or actual sequence perspective. However, if, as I have
suggested, there is a class of genuinely singular events that are not products
of the operation of reliable mechanisms, such events could not be given
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robust process explanations. Consider an explanation of how I met my
wife. That event, like many events in which people meet, involved a con-
fluence of events that were not to be expected and will not be repeated. In
our case, for instance, an explanation of the event would, at the very least,
involve an explanation of why each of us chose to attend graduate school
at the University of Chicago, an explanation of the factors that led us to
apply for student housing, and an explanation of the process that led the
housing office to place each of us in the same building. This is an actual
sequence explanation par excellence, but there does not appear to be a
corresponding robust process.
Given that robust processes arise from the operation of reliable mech-
anisms, it might seem that events that are not the product of robust pro-
cesses cannot be given a mechanistic explanation. Here, however, it is
useful to recall the distinction made above between mechanisms as things
and mechanisms as processes. The actual sequence of events is a process;
it is simply not a robust process. Mechanisms in the sense of Salmon and
Railton can characterize the actual sequence of events and connecting
processes that bring about a particular explanandum event, even if that
sequence does not represent the operation of a robust process. Such an
explanation can be called a fragile actual-sequence explanation.
Even though mechanisms as complex systems cannot explain fragile
actual sequences, there is still one point where the Salmon/Railton account
can be improved upon by reference to the complex-systems conception of
mechanism. This point concerns how an “actual sequence” of events is
specified. Because events in the universe are capable of all sorts of descrip-
tions at various levels of spatial and temporal grain, it is not exactly clear
what could be meant by the “actual sequence of events.” In the case of
World War I, what events are in this actual sequence? Sterelny suggests
that this sequence includes such things as the firing of a pistol at the Arch-
duke, but why do we describe events at this level? Why not, for instance,
describe the trajectories of molecules in the Archduke’s body?
The reason for this choice is that, even in fragile actual-sequence ex-
planations, the description of a process is guided by considerations of
robustness and reliability. The “actual sequence” of events leading up to
the beginning of the First World War could aptly be described as a fragile
process with robust parts. This description is apt because, even in actual-
sequence explanations, we characterize processes in terms of interactions
of robust entities. Gavril Princip, the Archduke, his driver, etc. are all
robust entities whose interactions comprise the sequence of events leading
to the First World War. The particular arrangement of the parts (e.g., the
location of the Archduke and the Assassin on the fateful day) may be
ephemeral, the parts themselves (the Archduke and the Assassin) are not.
Consequently, it was predictable what was going to happen when one part,
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the Assassin, used another part, the Gun, at close range to shoot at a third
part, the Archduke. Much the same thing can be said about my earlier
example of the ball breaking the window. While the particular configu-
ration of ball, bat, tree and window is not robust, those things themselves
are robust. In both cases, it is the robustness of these parts that accounts
for our decision to describe actual sequences in terms of interactions be-
tween them.
5. Unification by Common Mechanisms. Whatever the merits of their par-
ticular proposals, advocates of unification models are right to insist that
scientific explanations generally unify our understanding of the world.
How can the proponent of causal-mechanical explanation account for this
property of explanation? Salmon makes the following proposal:
We explain events by showing how they fit into the causal nexus. Since
there seem to be a small number of fundamental causal mechanisms,
and some extremely comprehensive laws that govern them, the ontic
conception has as much right as the epistemic conception to take the
unification of natural phenomena as a basic aspect of our compre-
hension of the world. The unity lies in the pervasiveness of the un-
derlying mechanisms upon which we depend for explanation. (Salmon
1984, 276)
In concluding this paper I will explore whether Salmon’s proposal does
justice to the idea of explanation as unification.
When Salmon speaks of “fundamental causal mechanisms” governed
by “extremely comprehensive laws,” he seems to have in mind some set
of basic types of microphysical interactions, governed by what I have
termed fundamental physical laws. Salmon’s view is that mechanistic ex-
planations provide unifying understanding of the world by appealing to
these laws. This view is consistent with some of the best examples of ex-
planatory unification. Consider, for example, Newton’s explanation of the
motion of the planets, the behavior of projectiles, and the changing tides.
In showing that all of these phenomena can be explained in terms of the
operation of a single fundamental force, Newton engaged in an impressive
act of explanatory unification.
While there are other examples in which we appeal to fundamental laws
to explain a variety of apparently diverse phenomena, there are many
kinds of unification that do not involve appeal to fundamental mechanisms
or laws. Our discussion in the preceding section showed how character-
ization of the mechanisms that give rise to robust processes often takes
one away from the microphysical detail of actual sequences. Robust
higher-level mechanisms are, to use Wimsatt’s (1994) phrase, dynamically
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autonomous—that is, the higher level processes are relatively insensitive
to changes in the microphysical processes on which they supervene.
The complex-systems approach to mechanisms does not suppose that
unification derives from unity of fundamental mechanisms. According to
the complex-systems approach, mechanisms are collections of parts and
parts are objects, but the objects that are parts of mechanisms may them-
selves be complex structures. An information processing mechanism used
in human cognition may have interacting parts in the sense required by
the complex-systems conception, even if these parts are spatially distrib-
uted and realized by different neurological components in different in-
stances of the mechanism. This and other examples show that the explan-
atory unification afforded by the mechanistic approach derives not only
from the commonality of fundamental laws but from the existence of
mechanisms that have a common higher-level structure even if they differ
in microstructure.
Even if the complex-systems approach can provide a reasonable ac-
count of how mechanistic explanations unify, there remains an important
metaphysical controversy over the priority of the concepts of explanation
and causation. The unificationist argues that explanations precede causes
while the mechanist argues that mechanisms precede causes. Kitcher rep-
resents the unificationist position as follows:
The heart of the unification approach is that we cannot make sense
of the notion of a basic mechanism apart from a systemization of the
world in which as many consequences as possible are traced to the
action of as small a number of basic mechanisms as possible. (Kitcher
1989, 497)
The mechanist has a simple answer to this: Kitcher has confused episte-
mological and metaphysical questions. The claim that we identify basic
mechanisms by choosing those mechanisms that maximally unify our un-
derstanding of diverse phenomena is really a claim about how we discover
and test theories about mechanisms. It is related to the claim that we
choose scientific theories on the basis of their simplicity and scope. While
there is undoubtedly truth in Kitcher’s claim about how we discover and
test theories about fundamental mechanisms, we can still “make sense of
the notion of a basic mechanism” apart from this global perspective. In
fact, our concept of causation suggests that events occurring at some point
in space and time are explained as the consequence of the operation of
causal mechanisms operating in that region of space and time. Our global
evidence suggests that—quantum mechanics aside—causality is every-
where local.
This brief argument will probably not convince instrumentalists of the
reality of causes, but I hope it is enough to show that Kitcher’s position
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is not the only possible interpretation of the global character of theory
choice. And if it is possible to treat causes as prior to explanations, it is
also possible to see how causal explanations can provide explanatory uni-
fication.
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